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Introduction
Electoral competition should provide incentives for the incumbent leader to act in voters' interests. Electoral competition theory studies two types of incentives. The …rst case (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986 ) assumes that voters vote retrospectively and punishes bad behavior by removing poorly performing incumbents from o¢ ce. Because the electorate rewards good performance with reappointment to o¢ ce, incumbents are motivated to exert costly e¤ort. In this type of model, voters use a backward-looking strategy in which they do not change their re-election rule after observing the incumbent's performance. I call this incentive an explicit incentive because it is similar to the incentive that would have arisen if an explicit performance-contingent contract without any mention of commitment had been given to the incumbent at the beginning of the period. Another type of incentive, which I refer to as implicit incentive, arises when the incumbent's performance in the current period provides information about some variable that a¤ects voters'payo¤ in later periods. This literature starts with Holmstorm's (1999) seminal work on a managerial incentive problem in a dynamic setting. In this model (Lohmann, 1998 ; Persson and Tabellini, 2000: chaps. 4 and 9), popularly known as a career concern model, economic performance signals the incumbent's competence, and voters reward competence with reelection. To appear more competent and increase the chances of reelection, the incumbent undertakes costly e¤ort. These models do not assume any voter commitment to a speci…c reelection rule. Instead, voters reelect the incumbent only if the expected payo¤ from reelecting the incumbent exceeds the expected payo¤ from not reelecting the incumbent.
Although these theories capture important aspects of reality, each has its own de…ciencies. In the retrospective voting model voters are strongly committed to their re-election rule. The career concern model does not take the policy e¤ectiveness into consideration. In reality, voters payo¤ depends not only on the e¤ort put in by politicians but also on the current policies'e¤ectiveness. If an economic policy fails to address their interests, voters care more about replacing the policy than electing competent o¢ cials. The career concern model completely ignores the role of policy e¤ectiveness, however. It also predicts that politicians work hard only in their career-building stages; as information about competence level becomes certain to voters, politicians'incentive to exert e¤ort disappears.
In this paper, I consider an alternate factor that can provide an implicit incentive to leaders to undertake desirable but costly e¤ort: the absence of perfect observability of policy e¤ectiveness. To this end, I analyze a model where both policy and e¤ort a¤ect outcome. Voters can only observe the outcome; they cannot distinguish the impact of the policy from the e¤ort of the politician. Voters can replace a politician by incurring a transition cost. The model assumes that if the incumbent exerts e¤ort, a better economic outcome is more likely under an e¤ective economic policy than an ine¤ective one. In this scenario, if voters observe a bad outcome, and if they still believe the incumbent has exerted e¤ort, then they would attribute the bad outcome only to a bad economic policy. If the chances of reelection increase with policy e¤ectiveness, the incumbent would exert e¤ort to convince voters that the policy is indeed e¤ective.
I consider an in…nitely repeated election game where the incumbent leader faces a series of elections. When some uncertainty regarding the policy e¤ectiveness is present, the implicit incentive can sustain e¤ort in every period. Furthermore, given a level of uncertainty about current policy e¤ectiveness, I …nd an upper limit on the cost of e¤ort such that for any level of cost below that limit, there exists an equilibrium where the incumbent always exerts e¤ort in equilibrium. This equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium if the cost of transition is less than the probability of e¤ectiveness of an untested policy. For a higher range of values of the transition cost, there will be multiple equilibria. I also …nd that the incumbent does not change the policy in equilibrium even if the cost of changing the policy is negligible. These results show that even if an implicit incentive can induce incumbents to undertake the costly e¤ort, it fails to motivate them to change a policy when it is not ex ante optimal. Hence, the electorate can never achieve the ex ante …rst best outcome. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present a two-period model to illustrate policy uncertainty's ability to induce responsive behavior by the incumbent in the …rst period. Section 3 describes the in…nite horizon model. Section 4 discusses the role of the imperfect observability assumption. Sections 5-7 present the equilibrium analysis and section 8 concludes with a brief discussion.
1.1. Related literature. The explicit incentive models described earlier originate from Barro (1973) . In Barro, politicians want to maximize rent from holding o¢ ce. Voters can control incumbents'behavior by basing the incumbents' reelection probability on their delivery of social welfare above a threshold. Because politicians desire reappointment, election acts as a disciplinary mechanism to control incumbent behavior. Ferejohn (1986) studies an extended version of this game with exogenous rents from o¢ ce and costly e¤ort. Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) adapt the same model and show how separation of power can induce responsive behavior in the incumbent. Finally, Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) study electoral accountability when voters adopt retrospective voting strategies based on the di¤erence between incumbents'performance and their initial policy platform.
The literature on implicit incentives draws on Holmstrom's (1999) career concern model, which is extended by Tirole (1999a, 1999b) to allow alternative assumptions regarding information structure. Applied in political theory (Persson and Tabellini, 2000) , the career concerns model assumes candidates maximize the expected value of their competence and studies the role of election as a selection mechanism. Ashworth (2005) considers a similar career concern model with policy uncertainty. In Ashworth, politicians decide how to allocate resources between constituency work and policy work during their tenure. He …nds that politicians devote excessive time to constituency work early in their career to a¤ect voters'learning process; only career concern motivates politicians to exert e¤ort. In this kind of model, information about the candidate's intrinsic type is revealed through outcome. In my model, on the other hand, voters learn information about economic policy, which the candidate may change if he wishes. Thus, the decision whether to continue with the previous period's policy and give information about the policy to voters, is a strategic decision by the candidate.
Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) study an electoral accountability model where voters are illinformed about policy e¤ectiveness. In addition, while voters know that candidates have more accurate information, they are aware that the quality of the information depends upon candidates'competence levels, which are also their private information. They analyze conditions under which candidates may or may not pander to voters by choosing a popular policy, given their private information about policy e¤ec-tiveness. Since quality of private information varies across candidates, the election also acts as a selection mechanism. Maskin and Tirole (2004) also study a similar model of executive policy making. Maskin and Tirole study relative e¢ ciency of di¤erent constitutional designs, namely, accountable politicians, non-accountable judges, and direct democracy in policy making. In this kind of model, candidates have more information about policy e¤ectiveness than voters have. Candidates sometime pander to voters by following popular policy, even if their private information suggest that the policy could be ine¤ective. In my model, on the other hand, voters and candidates have the same information. Given the same level of information about policy e¤ectiveness, I address the moral hazard question in a political agency framework.
The most closely related studies on sustaining costly e¤ort for an in…nite number of periods are Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Hörner (2003) . In Mailath and Samuelson, the agent can occasionally exit the market, but the principal cannot observe this event. Given this kind of unobservability, they show that a responsive equilibrium can last for an in…nite number of periods. In Hörner, reputation-building behavior arises under persistent competition in which …rms' revenues do not vary continuously with consumer expectation.
A two-period example
In this section, I present a two-period model to illustrate how opportunist leaders can commit to serve responsibly when there is imperfect observability of policy outcome. In each period, a leader holds o¢ ce and decides whether to run the o¢ ce responsibly or corruptly. His payo¤ from holding the o¢ ce is b. He incurs a cost of c e > 0 if he runs the o¢ ce responsibly. If he is out of o¢ ce, he gets zero. The leader chooses a policy variable with an outcome of p: The policy can be e¤ective or ine¤ective. Ex ante, the probability that any policy would be e¤ective is 2 (0; 1). A leader can implement a new policy at no cost when he is serving his …rst term in o¢ ce; thus, in the …rst period, the leader can choose any policy vector at no cost. If he is reelected, however, he enters the second period, where he incurs a costs to implement a new policy. Let c p > 0 denote the leader's cost of changing the existing policy. Note that a challenger, if elected, does not face any cost to change the policy in the second period because he is serving his …rst term. In each period, all leaders want to maximize expected payo¤s. We assume that the leader's e¤ort is observable only to the leader himself. Voters observe only outcomes.
At the end of each period, an outcome is realized. The outcome can be good (G), moderate (M ) ; or bad (B). I consider a single voter who receives utility from the realized outcome. The voter gets 2 units of utility if the outcome is good, 1 unit of utility if the outcome is moderate and 0 units of utility if the outcome is bad. Both the implemented policy and the leader's e¤ort a¤ect outcome. If the policy is e¤ective and the leader serves corruptly, the outcome would be M ; if the leader serves responsibly, then the outcome can be either G with probability or M with probability (1 ) . On the other hand, if the policy is ine¤ective, then the outcome is bad if the leader serves corruptly; if he serves responsibly then either a moderate outcome is realized with probability or a bad outcome is realized with probability (1 ) . If the leader replaces the existing policy with a new policy, then the probability that the new policy would be e¤ective is given by a parameter > 0: Notably, voters pay a transition cost c t > 0 whenever they elect a non-incumbent leader.
The game involves three players: an incumbent leader I a challenger C and a voter. The game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of period 1; I chooses a policy and decides whether to serve responsibly. At the end of period 1; the …rst-period outcome is realized and everyone observes the outcome. The voter updates his belief regarding the type of the policy chosen in period 1, and decides whether or not reelect the incumbent. Then, period 2 begins and the temporal game is repeated. We consider the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies for this game. Therefore, the strategy of every player is sequentially rational given other players'strategies and the belief is updated according to the Bayes' rule along the equilibrium path. There are essentially two di¤erent kinds of equilibria. In one of these, the incumbent serves responsibly in the …rst period. In the other, he serves corruptly in the …rst period. I will call the former R equilibria, and the latter C equilibria.
2.1.
Equilibrium under perfect observation. In the perfect observation case, the voter can perfectly observe the policy's e¤ectiveness at the end of the …rst period. Since in the …nal period, whoever runs the o¢ ce will not take any costly action, the voter only cares about the policy's e¤ectiveness. Moreover, the incumbent's actions in the …rst-period cannot a¤ect the voter's perception of the policy's e¤ectiveness; indeed, because the voter can perfectly observe the policy's outcome, the incumbent's actions cannot sway voter perception. Hence, the incumbent will not take any costly action even in the …rst period.
Only C equilibria exist in the perfect observation case. If < c t in this C equilibria, the o¢ ce is run corruptly in both period 1 and period 2. The voter always reelects the incumbent in this case, and the challenger, if elected, either continues with the existing policy (in one possible equilibrium) or may select a new policy (another possible equilibrium). If c t ; then there is another electoral equilibrium in which the voter replaces the incumbent if and only if the …rst period policy is ine¤ective, the challenger chooses a new policy in the second period, and the o¢ ce is run corruptly both in period 1 and in period 2:
2.2. Equilibrium under imperfect observation. In the imperfect observation case, the voter can observe the policy's e¤ectiveness only if the policy produces an extreme result. If o = M , then the voter cannot determine whether this outcome stems from an ine¤ective policy selection or incumbent corruption. If the voter expects the incumbent to run the o¢ ce responsibly, then after observing the moderate outcome M , he revises his belief about the policy's e¤ectiveness following Bayes'rule:
If the incumbent serves responsibly, then a moderate outcome could occur under e¤ective policy with a probability of (1 ) : So in the numerator we have the probability of a moderate outcome under an e¤ective policy, and in the denominator, we have the total probability of a moderate outcome. If the voter does not expect the incumbent to serve responsibly, then his belief about the policy's e¤ectiveness will be:
Indeed, if the voter expects the incumbent not to serve responsibly, then a moderate outcome can occur only if the policy is e¤ective. Because
if the voter expects the incumbent to serve responsibly, and if the incumbent does not do so, then the posterior probability of the policy's e¤ectiveness will decrease. This situation endogenously creates an incentive for the incumbent to serve responsibly. On the other hand, if the voter expects the incumbent to serve corruptly, the incumbent can increase the posterior probability of the policy's e¤ectiveness by deviating to serve responsibly. Thus, under imperfect observation, it is possible to sustain an equilibrium in which the incumbent serves responsibly in the …rst period.
Before stating the …rst proposition, I introduce a new variable here. Let 1 be de…ned as follows:
1 measures the di¤erence in expected bene…t between a new policy and an existing policy that resulted in a moderate outcome in the last period. 1 is positive if and only if 1 2 : If the transition cost c t is greater than 1 , then the voter's expected return from selecting a challenger would be low compared with the expected return from reelecting the incumbent after observing a moderate outcome. Therefore, the voter would reward the politician even after observing a moderate outcome, when he believes that the politician served responsibly.
Proposition 1.
If 1 c t + ; then an R equilibrium exists if
In this R equilibrium, the incumbent serves responsibly in the …rst period. The voter reelects the incumbent if either a good or a moderate outcome is realized. In the second period, if the incumbent is reelected, he continues with the existing policy and serves corruptly. If the challenger is elected, then the challenger selects a new policy, and serves corruptly. If 0 c t < 1 , an R equilibrium exists if
In this R equilibrium, the incumbent serves responsibly in the …rst period. The voter reelects the incumbent only if a good outcome is realized. In the second period, if the incumbent is reelected, he continues with the existing policy and serves corruptly. If the challenger is elected, then the challenger selects a new policy, and serves corruptly. Moreover, if b ce
This result arises from the following line of reasoning. If the transition cost is too high in particular, if c t 1 then the voter cannot credibly commit to a punishment strategy leading him to reelect the incumbent only if a good outcome occurs. In this case, if I serves responsibly, he will not be reelected only when the outcome is bad, a situation that has probability (1 ) (1 ) : On the other hand, if he serves corruptly, a bad outcome would be realized when the policy is ine¤ective, which has probability (1 ) : The incumbent achieves a short-term gain c e (negative of loss by serving responsibly), however, by serving corruptly in the …rst period. To decide whether to serve corruptly or responsibly, the incumbent compares the short-term gain c e with the expected loss in second-period payo¤ (b + c e ) ( (1 ) (1 ) ( 1 )) from serving corruptly: By comparing,we get the condition for the existence of an R equilibrium when 1 c t : If c t < 1 , the voter can commit to a punishment strategy in which he reelects the incumbent only when the outcome is good. In this case, the incumbent compares his short-term gain c from serving corruptly in the …rst period with the expected loss (b + c e ) (1 ) from serving corruptly. In any C equilibrium, the incumbent does not have an incentive to serve responsibly if the voter expects him to serve corruptly. When the incumbent is expected to serve corruptly, a bad outcome will not be realized only if the policy is e¤ective. Therefore, by deviating to serve responsibly in the …rst period, the incumbent can increase his reelection probability to 1 by probability ( (1 ) (1 ) ( 1 )) : Hence, the incumbent deviates if his expected bene…t from doing so (b + c e ) ( (1 ) (1 ) (1 )) exceeds his short-term loss from deviation or c e .
2.3.
Comparative statics results on :. Note that 1 approaches zero as approaches either 0 or 1. Let us consider a strictly positive transition cost c t > 0 and > 1 2 so that 1 is strictly positive. As goes to zero (i.e., when < c t ) no R equilibrium exists. As goes to 1, we will have 1 c t : Therefore, only the …rst type of R equilibria mentioned in Proposition 1 can arise. As becomes large, however,
1
(1 ) (1 ) will become arbitrarily high, which implies that no R equilibrium will exist. So for extreme values of (i.e., those that approach 0 or 1), R equilibria do not exist. For intermediate values of ; on the other hand, R equilibria can exist.
The incumbent's decision not to serve responsibly in all periods depends critically on two assumptions: First, if a policy is e¤ective in the …rst period, then it is assumed to be e¤ective in the second period, too; furthermore, the second period is the game's …nal period. The …rst assumption plays the following role: If, at the end of the …rst period, an extreme outcome occurs, then the voter receives perfect information about the type of policy; so, in subsequent periods, the incumbent's action does not change the policy's expected value to the voters. The incumbent therefore has no incentive to serve responsibly once an extreme outcome occurs. If a moderate outcome occurs, on the other hand, the voter's posterior belief in the policy's e¤ectiveness would be weaker than his prior belief when he expects the incumbent to serve responsibly. He can still reelect the incumbent, however, provided that the transition cost exceeds the di¤erence in the expected gain from following an untested new policy and from continuing with the existing policy that resulted in that last period's moderate outcome.
The role of the second assumption is the strongest in the two-period game. If we extend this game to a multi-period setting, as the number of periods increases, the e¤ect of this assumption weakens, and we …nd the following: In the last period, the candidate does not serve responsibly. But in any period other than the …nal period, the incumbent would exert e¤ort after a moderate outcome occurs. To demonstrate the e¤ect of the …rst assumption, in the following section we drop the second assumption in an in…nite horizon setup and show that equilibria exist in which the candidate can commit to serve responsibly in every period.
Infinite horizon game
In the previous section, I illustrated, in a two-period example how unobservability of candidate e¤ort can generate an implicit incentive for the incumbent politician to respond to voters'interests. We now explore this implicit incentive in an in…nite horizon setting. More speci…cally, I examine a political setup in which a long-lived incumbent politician faces a series of elections. In every election, a single voter decides whether to reelect the incumbent or the challenger. In this setting, the incumbent is di¤erent from a challenger on the following grounds: a) the incumbent faces a positive cost to change the existing policy whereas the challenger does not, and b) the voter faces a positive cost if the incumbent is not reelected. I call the …rst type of cost the persistency cost (denoted by c p ) and the second type of cost the transition cost (denoted by c t ). Empirical support for policy persistence abounds. One interpretation for this phenomenon states that the groups who bene…t from the current policy also provide political support to the ruling party, thereby in ‡uencing political decision making. The transition cost may result from the ine¢ ciency of the new leader, who is still learning the job, or the cost to the voter of supporting a successful campaign to replace the incumbent leader. The voter encounters a trade-o¤ in replacing the incumbent leader: he weighs a transition cost against a cost of continuing an ine¤ective policy. This is an in…nitely repeated game in which election occurs in discrete time periods indexed by t; t = 1; 2; ::. The period-t stage game is formulated as described in the previous example. At the end of each period, good, moderate, or bad outcome is realized. A generic outcome is denoted by z, where z takes a value in the set fG; M; Bg. I consider a single voter (avoiding con ‡ict of interest among voters) who gains utility from the realized outcome. In particular, I consider a simple payo¤ structure in which the voter earns 2 units of utility if z = G, 1 unit of utility if z = M , and 0 units of utility if z = B. For every period, the existing leader receives a bene…t from holding o¢ ce, given by b > 0: A losing candidate receives zero payo¤. The leader decides whether to serve responsibly or corruptly. A responsible e¤ort incurs a positive cost, given by c e > 0:
Both the implemented policy and the leader's e¤ort a¤ect outcome.. A policy can be either e¤ective or ine¤ective. Under an e¤ective policy:
If the leader serves corruptly, z = M If the leader serves responsibly, z = G M with probability with probability 1 :
Under an ine¤ective policy :
If the leader serves corruptly, z = B
If the leader serves responsibly, z = M B with probability with probability 1 :
If a new policy replaces the existing policy, then the probability of the new policy's e¤ectiveness is given by a parameter > 0:
To sustain the implicit incentive in an in…nitely repeated game setting, uncertainty about the policy's e¤ectiveness must be present in every period. I introduce a new parameter to incorporate this behavior. In particular, I assume a policy that was e¤ective in the last period could be ine¤ective in the current period with some positive probability 2 (0; 1) : So, even after acquiring perfect information about last period's policy, the voter is unsure whether the policy will still be e¤ective in the current period. This uncertainty has two implications in our setup. First, it directly reduces the expected value of a policy that was e¤ective in the most recent period. As the resale value of the e¤ective policy diminishes, the incumbent's incentive to serve responsibly decreases. On the other hand, this strengthens the voter's commitment to follow a strict punishment strategy of rewarding the incumbent only when a good outcome is realized. This behavior occurs because the policy's expected value in the next period after a moderate outcome occurs in the last period is reduced by a factor (1 ). Thus, the relative importance of an alternate policy increases even when there is a positive transition cost.
3.0.1. t th period stage game. The t-th period starts with an election in which the voter decides whether to reelect the incumbent. Let I t denote the incumbent who held the o¢ ce in the last period, and let C t denote the challenger. The winner of this election holds the o¢ ce for the current period. He …rst decides whether to replace the previous period's policy. The state variable, denoted by t ; is the common belief that the last period's policy is e¤ective in the current period. Let t denote the interim belief after the winner makes the decision whether to replace the previous period's policy. So, t equals t if the winner does not replace the previous period's policy, and equals otherwise. Next, the winner …nally decides whether to serve responsibly. At the end of the period, the outcome is realized. Voters then update their belief that the current policy would remain e¤ective in the next period; this new belief becomes the next period's state value. In the in…nite horizon setup we assume that the candidate wants to maximize the discounted sum of future payo¤s where the discount factor is given by 2 (0; 1) : The mapping n i ( ) is the probability that last period's policy is replaced by a new policy. The mapping r i ( ) is the probability of the o¢ ce holder's serving responsibly given the interim belief : Note that the choice of n i ( ) entirely determines the interim belief : If n i ( ) equals 0; then equals ; otherwise equals : A Markovian pure strategy for C t is given by the mappings:
The mapping n c ( ) is the probability that the last period's policy is replaced by a new policy. The mapping r c ( ) is the probability the o¢ ce holder will serve responsibly given the interim belief : The only di¤erence between these candidates is that C t incurs zero cost to change the policy whereas I t incurs a positive cost c p > 0. The voter's Markovian pure strategy is given by the mapping
where v i is the probability of reelecting I t : The voter is considered to be myopic and maximizes only his next period payo¤. By keeping the voter's strategy as a function only of his interim belief, I implicitly assume that a candidate who starts the period with the state value and decides to retain the policy will be treated the same as a candidate who starts with any di¤erent state value but changes the policy.. I use ( (z)) to denote the voter's posterior belief that the policy would be e¤ective in the next period given the outcome z and the interim belief : In Markov perfect equilibrium, the candidates maximize the discounted sum of future payo¤s; the voter, on the other hand, maximizes his return from the current period and uses Bayes'rule to update the posterior probabilities. De…nition 1. A Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies is the vector (r i ; n i ; r c ; n c; v; ) such that a: (r i ; n i ) ; (r c ; n c ) ; and v are payo¤ -maximizing strategies of the incumbent, the challenger, and the voters given others' strategies. b: beliefs are updated following Bayes' rule:
i:
ii:
where k denotes the candidate who is serving in the current period. iii:
For notational simplicity, I will denote ( (z)) by z from now on: Note that if the leader serves corruptly in equilibrium, then the outcome G will not be reached with strictly positive probability. I assume that if the voter observes a good outcome when he expects the leader to serve corruptly, the voter assigns probability one to the event that the policy is e¤ective.
The role of the imperfect observability of policy effect
Before illustrating how the implicit incentive is generated in the in…nite horizon game, I address the benchmark case: perfect observability of policy e¤ectiveness. If policy e¤ectiveness were perfectly observable at the end of the period t 1, then at the beginning of the t-th period, the voter would know for sure whether the policy was e¤ective in the last period. This fact implies two possible values for t : 0 or (1 ) : Moreover, the incumbent's action does not a¤ect the voter's posterior belief. Therefore, his continuation payo¤ from period t + 1, which depends only on the voter's posterior belief, is independent of his action in the current period. This behavior implies that the winner of the election, regardless whether he is the incumbent or the challenger, will not incur the positive cost c e of serving responsibly. Thus, the game merely boils down to the winner deciding in every period whether to change the policy and incurring the cost c p : In this game, there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in which no leader serves responsibly. The following proposition describes the equilibrium behavior in the perfect observability case. Proposition 2. In any Markov equilibrium, when the voter can perfectly observes policy e¤ ectiveness, the incumbent never changes the policy. If elected, neither the incumbent nor the challenger exerts any e¤ ort to serve responsibly.
Proof. See Appendix.
Notably, these properties can arise in many equilibria. In fact, for any 0 2 (0; 1 ) ; there exists an equilibrium in which the voter uses the following reelection strategy:
This reelection strategy can be supported in an equilibrium in which the incumbent's strategy is given by (n i ; r i = 0) ; where n i (0) = n i = (1 ) = 0, and n i ( ) 2 f0; 1g for all 2 (0; 1 ) : Because can take only two possible values -0 and (1 ) -and because v (0) = 0; the only values of the state variable at which the leader makes a move is (1 ) : For both the voter and the challenger, it is optimal not to change the policy at = (1 ) :
5. Analysis 5.1. Implicit incentive and disincentive for responsive behavior. If, at any state in an equilibrium, the voter expects leader to serve responsibly, then the leader must have an incentive to exert e¤ort at that state value. If he serves responsibly at an interim belief ; where the voter believes he's serving responsibly, the leader's payo¤ is
If he deviates to serve corruptly when the voters believe he's serving responsibly, his payo¤ is
So, if at a state that can be reached along the equilibrium path with a positive probability that the leader serves responsibly, (?) must be greater than or equal to (?). After simplifying, this constraint can be written as
For future reference, I will call this constraint the incentive constraint, and I will denote the expression on the left-hand side of the inequality by I ( ) : Similarly, at any state in an equilibrium, if the voter expects the leader to serve corruptly then the leader must have an incentive for serving corruptly. If he serves corruptly and is expected to serve corruptly, his payo¤ is
If instead he deviates to serve responsibly, his payo¤ is
Note that in this case, M = G = (1 ) : Hence, the leader will stick to the corrupt behavior when the voter expects him to do so, if the expression in (5:1) is greater than the expression in (5:2). After simplifying, this constraint can be written as
I will call this constraint the disincentive constraint, and I will denote the left hand side of the above inequality by D ( ) :
The voter' s decision problem.
The voter has to decide whether to reelect the incumbent before the incumbent leader moves. For any given interim belief ; the voter always will strictly prefer the leader to serve responsibly; indeed, responsible service by the leader always increases the voter's expected payo¤ given . Because the voter faces a transition cost c t > 0 when electing a challenger, the voter strictly will prefer the incumbent leader rather than the challenger to change the policy when the policy is no longer suiting his interests. To determine when a policy change is optimal for the voter, we compare his expected bene…t from the two action pro…les: (n i = 0; r i = 1) and (n i = 1; r i = 1) : His expected bene…t from the action pro…le (n i = 0; r i = 1) at state is
and his expected bene…t from the action pro…le (n i = 1; r i = 1) at state is
Comparing these bene…ts, we see that the voter would prefer a policy change if and only if < (given r i = 1). Hence, the voter's …rst-best would be to induce the incumbent leader to follow the strategy (n i = 0; r i = 1) if < and to follow (n i = 1; r i = 1) if . If < ; then the voter's interest will con ‡ict with the incumbent's only with regard to his decision to run the o¢ ce responsibly. However, if ; then the voter's interest will con ‡ict with the incumbent leader's both in terms of the incumbent's decision to change the existing policy and his decision to serve responsibly.
The following two results describe the voter's behavior in any Markov equilibrium of the game. The …rst lemma suggests that if, in any equilibrium, the incumbent changes the policy at a state , then the voter must have set a reelection probability of 1 at that state; indeed, if the incumbent changes the policy, the interim belief changes from to . At , on the other hand, the incumbent leader faces the same incentives as the challenger, so his optimal action would be the same as the action followed by the challenger. This situation implies that the voter would receive a higher expected utility from reelecting the incumbent; reelecting the incumbent allows the voter to save the transition cost of electing the challenger. Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, if at any state ; the incumbent replaces the policy (or, n i ( ) = 1); then the voter must reelect the incumbent (or, v ( ) = 1):
The following lemma suggests that we can e¤ectively restrict our attention only to the class of monotonically increasing strategies by the voter.
Lemma 2. In any Markov equilibrium, the voter's strategy must be monotonically increasing in .
First-best is never achievable
The voter can never achieve the …rst-best outcome as no Markov equilibrium in pure strategy will ever exist where the incumbent leader would change the policy. So, if < ; the voter cannot control the incumbent's decision to replace or maintain the ine¤ective policy. Even if the voter could possibly implement a new policy by electing the challenger, he would incur a cost of c t : The argument for proving this result follows.
From Lemma 2, we see that the voter's strategy in any equilibrium would be either (i) v ( ) equals 1 for all or (ii) v ( ) equals 0 if and only if < o for some 0 2 (0; 1 ) : In the …rst case, the incumbent will not exert any costly e¤ort because his action no longer a¤ect his reelection probability. However, the voter's payo¤ from electing the challenger is c t ; hence he must receive at least this much utility at any . This kind of equilibrium therefore survives only if c t 0: On the other hand, when the voter uses a cuto¤ strategy that is increasing in ; there is no equilibrium with n i ( ) = 1 : If for some ; n i ( ) = 1, the leader's continuation payo¤ must be as high as the persistence cost c p . In proving the theorem, I show that the incentive to change the policy, given any monotonically increasing reelection rule set by the voter, is maximized at = 0: So, if for some ; n i ( ) = 1, then the leader will have an incentive to change the policy at = 0. In that case, however, the voter would be better o¤ reelecting the leader at = 0. We therefore arrive at the following proposition: Proposition 3. There is no Markov equilibrium in pure strategies where the incumbent replaces the existing policy with a strictly positive probability at any state that can be reached with a positive probability along the equilibrium path.
This proposition does not mean that the implicit incentive to induce a responsive behavior from the leader would disappear. However, this does suggest that the voter could never achieve the …rst-best in this scenario. When < ; the voter could not make the incumbent leader change the existing policy. Notably, this result does not depend on the magnitude of the persistence cost.
Responsive equilibrium and other equilibria
De…nition 2. A responsive equilibrium is a Markov equilibrium in pure strategies where the leader serves the o¢ ce responsibly at every state that can be reached with a positive probability along the equilibrium path. A nonresponsive equilibrium is any equilibrium that is not a responsive equilibrium. A corrupt equilibrium is a Markov equilibrium in pure strategies where the leaders serve the o¢ ce corruptly at every state that can be reached with a positive probability along the equilibrium path.
Any corrupt equilibrium is therefore a nonresponsive equilibrium. Note that if the transition cost is high, the voter's ability to control the incumbent's behavior decreases as his payo¤ from the alternate option, that is, electing the challenger, decreases with the transition cost. The voter's maximum expected payo¤ from electing the challenger is + c t : This follows since the voter receives 2 if the outcome G is realized, which has the probability of occurrence if the challenger exerts e¤ort in equilibrium, and the voter receives 1 if the outcome M is realized, which has the probability of occurrence (1 )+ (1 ) after incurring the transition cost c t . Hence, if + c t < 0; the voter has no incentive to reelect the challenger in any scenario. However, for su¢ ciently low values of the cost of e¤ort, there will always be a responsive equilibrium.
Proposition 4.
If the transition cost c t is greater than ( + ) ; there will be no responsive equilibria. If the transition cost c t is less than or equals ( + ) ; then for any 2 (0; 1); there exists a constant c e ( ) > 0 such that for every level of cost of e¤ ort c e less than that the constant c e ; (or, 0 c e < c e ), there will be a responsive equilibrium.
Sketch of the proof: The above discussion suggests that if + c t < 0; then the voter will always elect the leader with probability 1. This reasoning implies that the leader will have a constant long-term value function that is independent of the state value . The incentive constraint I ( ) and the disincentive constraint D ( ) will not be satis…ed if the long-term value function is constant, however. Therefore, in this equilibrium, the implicit incentive for responsive behavior is absent; if the voter does not expect the leader to exert any e¤ort, the leader's optimal action would be to avoid exerting any e¤ort. To prove the second part, we …rst see that for any given , there exists c e > 0 such that the incentive constraint is satis…ed in a range of 2 [ 0 ; 1 ]. So, if the voter sets the reelection strategy as v ( ) = 1 if and only if 0 , then for all possible values of at which the incumbent is elected, the leader will face the incentive that induces responsive behavior. Moreover, for all c < c e , the same condition holds, implying that a responsive equilibrium will occur for any such c.
Note that if a responsive equilibrium exists, then we must have v (0) = 0: As from Lemma 2, we already know that if v (0) = 1; then v ( ) = 1 for all : But then the leader's long-term value function would be independent of . This fact implies that the leader will have no incentive to take any costly action; more speci…cally, he will have no incentive for responsive behavior along the equilibrium path. But this kind of equilibrium can survive only if the payo¤ from electing a challenger is negative even when the challenger is not working. The condition that determines the existence of such an equilibrium is c t < 0: If c t + ; in addition to the corrupt equilibria mentioned above, there will be responsive equilibria, which are unique in the voter's following strategy:
The uniqueness property is shown in the proof of Proposition 4 in the appendix. However, the number of equilibria that can be supported is in…nite. In particular, for any c < c e , there will be one such equilibrium.
It is easy to verify that as increases, the cuto¤ value c e ( ) decreases. For a low value of ; the set of values of c e that can satisfy the inequality I ( ) 0 is a subset of the set of the values of c e that satisfy the same inequality for a high value of : Corollary 1. As increases, c e ( ) decreases.
The above proposition gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of responsive equilibria. The expression ( + c t ) is the expected payo¤ from electing the challenger when he is committed to exert e¤ort in equilibrium. If + c t < 0; a corrupt equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium in which no candidate exerts any e¤ort at any state in equilibrium The state-path of this dynamic game is a stochastic process where at any period t; the state value can be either 1 or 0 with probabilities and 1 respectively, given the last period state value : It is evident that 0 is an absorbing state here. If + c t 0; both kinds of equilibria exist. In any responsive equilibrium, the voter must not reelect the incumbent if a bad outcome occurred in the last period. But, a corrupt equilibrium may exist in which the voter does reelect the incumbent even after a bad outcome occurred in the last period. Let us …rst …nd out the condition where the voter would reelect the incumbent after a bad outcome occurred, and therefore, the incumbent can not commit to exert any e¤ort. Since the voter is following a monotone strategy in equilibrium, if he reelects the incumbent following a bad outcome in the last period, he must reelects the incumbents at every state. If instead, he elects the challenger, in equilibrium, he can at least get c t . Moreover, in this kind of equilibrium, the challenger cannot commit to exert any e¤ort as the voter's reelection strategy in the following period does not depend on the current period outcome. Therefore, a corrupt equilibrium exists in which the voter always reelect the incumbent if and only if c t 0:
Proposition 5. A corrupt equilibrium in which the voter always reelect the incumbent exists if and only if the probability of e¤ ectiveness of an untested policy is less than or equals the transition cost c t (or, c t ):
Comparing the above result with proposition 4, we see that both responsive equilibrium and corrupt equilibrium exist if c t + : The condition c t is also a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium where the voter reelects the incumbent following a bad outcome in the last period. If c t < ; by electing the challenger the voter can at least get a strictly positive payo¤ c t : If he reelects the incumbent after a bad outcome occurred he gets zero payo¤. Because if an equilibrium exists and the incumbent gets reelected following a bad outcome, he will not exert any e¤ort. The voter's payo¤ by reelecting the incumbent in any equilibrium following a bad outcome will be 0: Thus, i¤ c t < ; in any equilibrium the voter must not reelect the incumbent following a bad outcome in the last period. Proposition 4 says that for su¢ ciently low cost of e¤ort, responsive equilibria exist.
To …nd other equilibria that may exist in this case, we study the relation between the incentive constraint I ( ) and disincentive constraint D ( ). If the voter does not reelect the incumbent following a bad outcome, then in any equilibrium, the incumbent's long term value function V at B = 0 would be 0: This property implies that the value function is a strictly increasing function in the posterior belief for all at which V ( ) > 0:
If in an equilibrium the voter does not reelect the incumbent following a bad outcome in the last period, the long term continuation payo¤ of the incumbent is zero when the posterior belief equals zero and it is strictly increasing in the posterior belief at all posterior belief in which the long term payo¤ is strictly positive.
Proof. In appendix.
From lemma 3, we can rewrite the incentive constraint and the disincentive constraint as
and,
Hence at some posterior belief ; if the incentive constraint is satis…ed, the disincentive constraint will not be satis…ed. This fact implies that if there is a responsive equilibria for a speci…c set of parameter values, no non responsive equilibrium can exist for the same set of parameter values. Furthermore, D ( ) is decreasing in the posterior belief : Hence, if in an equilibrium at some posterior belief ; the voter believes that the candidate will not exert any e¤ort, then at any posterior belief 0 > ; the candidate does not have any incentive to exert e¤ort. Combining these two facts together, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 6. When the probability of e¤ ectiveness of an untested policy is greater than the transition cost c t (or, c t < ); if a responsive equilibrium exists for a given set of parameter values, no non responsive equilibrium exists for the same set of parameter values.
Therefore if a responsive equilibria exists when the transition cost is less than the probability of e¤ectiveness of an untested policy, that responsive equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in that setting. Combining this result with the results from proposition 4, we see that for low values of transition cost, there exists a unique responsive equilibria.
Concluding remarks
Unobservability of policy e¤ectiveness plays a pivotal role in generating implicit incentives for leaders to serve responsibly. Underlying this result is the electorate's expectations for a leader's performance; by not performing, the leader weakens voters'belief in the policy's e¤ectiveness. Because voters care about the policy, if they believe the policy is ine¤ective, they will elect the challenger to change the existing policy. By doing so, they can make the leader commit to exert costly e¤ort. In the in…nite horizon game, I show that as long as some amount of uncertainty surrounds the policy's e¤ectiveness, this implicit incentive can last in every period. As uncertainty decreases, however, the condition required for existence of a responsive equilibrium becomes stringent. If the cost of transition is less than the probability of an untested policy's e¤ectiveness, then this responsive equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. Furthermore, this analysis suggests that even if the implicit incentive induces the leader to exert costly e¤ort, it fails to control the policy properly, even when voters perceive the policy to be ine¤ective ex ante.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In the two-period game, no player is going to take any costly action in the second period. This means that the incumbent if elected, is going to stick to the existing policy and serve corruptly and the challenger is going serve corruptly, too. However, if the challenger continues with the existing policy in any equilibrium, the voter is not going to elect him as he incurs a positive transition cost to elect the challenger. Therefore, if in any equilibrium, the voter elects the challenger, the challenger changes the policy. The expected bene…t to the voter of electing the challenger is therefore
: Let e denote the posterior probability that the policy is e¤ective. Clearly, e (G) = 1 e (B) = 1: When the incumbent serves responsibly, then
If the candidate serves corruptly, then if the policy is not changed, there will be no updating at that state since the bad outcome will be realized in subsequent periods, and by the Markov assumption, this is an absorbing state. The leader will get a continuation payo¤ of b= (1 ), which is the maximum possible payo¤ he can achieve. However, in that case the voter has incentive to replace him if c t > 0: Therefore if any equilibrium exists and if c t > 0, we have v (0) = 0. Moreover, this implies if any equilibrium exists, we must have n i (0) = 0, since otherwise the voter would elect the incumbent at = 0, contradicting that v (0) = 0: At any ; the leaders long term payo¤ function if he does not change the policy, is given by
where V ( ) is the value function of the leader when the value of the state variable is . On the other hand, by changing the policy he gets
So, he will have no incentive to change the policy at if ( ) < cp V (1 ) : As, 1 is assumed to be greater than , the voter will not change the policy if the policy is e¤ective. Finally the voter's expected payo¤ from electing the challenger is c t ; and he is going to elect the challenger if < c t at any that can be reached with positive probability along the equilibrium path: Only two values of will be reached, namely, 0 and (1 ). Therefore in any equilibrium, along the equilibrium path, the policy will not be changed by the incumbent.
Proof of Lemma 1. If possible, let us assume that v ( ) = 0 for some with n i ( ) = 1: This implies that the voter's payo¤ from electing the challenger is more than the payo¤ from reelecting the incumbent. Since not reelecting the incumbent is a costly action to the voter, this is possible only if r c ( ) = 1 and r i ( ) = 0 in equilibrium. However, by setting r c ( ) = 1, the challenger incurs a positive cost c e . This suggests that the challenger has a positive incentive to serve responsibly at : Since his incentive to serve responsibly only depends on the interim belief , and since the incumbent leader faces the same set of incentives the challenger faces, this implies that the incumbent would also choose r i ( ) = 1: But given n i ( ) = 1; r i ( ) = 1, the voter is strictly better o¤ by choosing v ( ) = 1: Contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose there exist 1 and 2 with 1 < 2 such that 1 = v ( 1 ) > v ( 2 ) = 0: From Lemma 1, we know that n i ( 2 ) must be equal to 0: I …rst claim that n i ( 1 ) also has to be equal to 0. If we have n i ( 1 ) = 1; which means that the incumbent replaces the policy at 1 ; then the continuation payo¤ of the incumbent at the interim belief must be greater than the transition cost c t . However, since the transition cost does not depend on the value of the state variable this implies that at 2 , the incumbent leader's payo¤ at 2 from following (n i = 1) is strictly positive. However, in that case the voter is strictly better o¤ by choosing v ( 2 ) to be equal to 1: Hence we must have n i ( 1 ) = 0: Furthermore, given n i ( 1 ) = 0; n i ( 2 ) = 0, and v ( 1 ) = 1; v ( 2 ) = 0; it must be the case 1 = r i ( 1 ) > r i ( 2 ) = 0: However, if in equilibrium r i ( 2 ) = 0; then the disincentive constraint must be satis…ed at 2 ; contradicting that the incentive constraint is satis…ed at 1 
:
Proof of Proposition 3. From Lemma 2, we know that the voter's strategy in any equilibrium must be of the following form:
, then the candidates will not take any costly action in any period as their action will not a¤ect their reelection probability. So consider the case when 0 2 (0; 1 ) : Moreover, if possible, suppose at some 0 0 , the incumbent replaces the policy, it implies that his continuation payo¤ at the belief (since after replacement, the interim belief changes to ) exceeds the persistence cost c p , or V ( ) c p max (V ( 0 ) ; 0).
Moreover, this continuation payo¤ is a function of only, and therefore is independent of . Therefore at any < 0 , the incumbent would actually be better o¤ by replacing the policy since V is decreasing in .
However, from Lemma 2, we see that in that case the voter would always reward the incumbent with reelection, contradicting that 0 > 0: 1 2 )) V ( M ) is always positive for every 2 [0; 1]; there exists c e > 0 such that the inequality is satis…ed for all c e < c e : Moreover, by setting 0 + to the payo¤ by electing the challenger, we get that 0 = c t :
Proof of Proposition 5. Case1: + c t : The maximum possible payo¤ that the voter can get by electing the challenger is 2 + (1 )+ (1 ) ; which is + : But he incurs a cost c t to make this transition. Hence, his net payo¤ is + c t : If his net payo¤ is negative, the voter will not elect the challenger for any belief : Given the voter's strategy to reelect the incumbent with probability 1 at any belief, the incumbent's optimal action will be not exerting e¤ort.
Case 2:
c t < + :
In this situation, if in an equilibrium the challenger can commit to exert e¤ort after his election, the voter's net payo¤ will be positive. I show that there always exists an equilibrium in which the challenger fail to commit to exert any e¤ort. Therefore, the voter's net payo¤ from electing the challenger will be c t , which is negative. Consider a strategy pro…le, in which the voter reelects the incumbent at any belief : If the voter follows this strategy, the challenger, if elected, will have no incentive to exert e¤ort. By exerting e¤ort, he incurs a cost c e ; but his probability of reelection does not change. Therefore, given this strategy followed by the voter, the challenger cannot commit to exert e¤ort. On the other hand, if the challenger does not exert e¤ort, the voter's strategy to elect the incumbent at any posterior is rational, since his payo¤ from electing the challenger is negative. Therefore, this equilibrium exists as long as c t : In this equilibrium, no candidate exerts e¤ort at any stage. The voter always reelect incumbent with probability 1:
Case 3: c t < :
We need to show that there does not exist any corrupt equilibrium in which the voter always reelect the incumbent with probability 1 at any posterior. To see this, let us assume, if possible, the converse is true.
However, if the voter always reelects the incumbent, then the incumbent will not take any costly action at any stage. But then by electing the challenger, the voter gets c t ; which is strictly positive. When the belief is low (less than c t ), reelecting the incumbent is not rational strategy for the voter. Hence contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3. Note that the posterior belief about the policy e¤ectiveness after observing a bad outcome is 0 (or, B = 0 at any ). Since V ( G ) > V ( M ) for any belief we have I ( ) < D ( ) for every . In a responsive equilibrium exists, I ( ) 0 at every that will be reached in equilibrium with positive probability. Hence, D ( ) > 0 at every that will be reached with positive probability in that equilibrium. 
